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DISCRIMINATING AMONG RIGHTS?: A
NATION'S LEGISLATING A HIERARCHY OF




Whereas, Member States have pledged themselves to
achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas, a common understanding of these rights and
freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full
realization of this pledge .... I
In 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with forty-eight of its fifty-six
members voting in favor.2 The Declaration, adopted only three years
after the United Nations Charter, was to clarify and specify the "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" which the Charter intended to
protect.3 Though the Declaration was a non-binding instrument, its
adoption recognized that human rights were not only deserving of
international concern, but also of international protection.4 As the
Declaration's preamble states, members of the United Nations (U.N.)
I Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. res. 217A (II), U.N. Doc.
A/810, preamble, para. 6, 7 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2 HENRY J. STEINER & PHIuP ALS ON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CoNrExT. LAW,
POLrIcS, MORALS 119 (1996). The eight countries not voting in favor of the Declaration
abstained from the vote. These eight countries were Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet
Union, Belorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. M. G. Kaladharan
Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 813, 816 n.18 (1978). See also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 15 (1982) [hereinafter The New
International Law].
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Specifically, the Charter hoped "to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small .... Id. The General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration on December 10, 1948, and for this reason,
many countries celebrate December 10th as Human Rights Day. JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1993) [hereinafter DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS].
4 See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
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pledged "co-operation," in the "promotion" of human rights.5 But how
were over fifty countries, each with its own form of government,
cultures, religions, and languages, to determine what constituted human
rights and how those rights would be protected?
Though the answers to these questions were not evident when the
Declaration was adopted, the drafters provided a sort of guidepost, a
curb to follow in the world's quest to identify and protect human rights.
Very simply, the Declaration calls for a "common understanding" of
rights and freedoms. 6 As the drafters intimated, without this common
understanding, the promise of states to promote respect for human
rights would not be fully realized. International protection of human
rights, however, has not solely taken place under the auspices of the
United Nations. For this reason, not only does the Declaration call for a
common understanding, but it also states that the Declaration is to be the
"common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."7
Thus, the Declaration serves both as a rallying point for a common
understanding of human rights and a guide for the common standard in
international action.
In addition to participation in U.N. sponsored protection, states
must act independently8 or may act on a regional basis9 to protect human
rights on an international level. While independent action no doubt
contributes to the realization of human rights on an international level,
this approach does not come without its hazards. When a state acts
independently, its methods of protection or lack of international support
5 Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6 Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at preamble, para. 7.
7 Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at preamble, para. 8.
8 In signing the U.N. Charter, the member states "pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the [United Nations]." U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, at
art. 55, 56. In promoting human rights on an international level, states may act
independently through their foreign policy, by providing remedies for victims of human
rights abuses in its courts, and through diplomatic pressure. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 940-956 (1995). See infra notes 152-156 for discussion of state
protection of international human rights norms through foreign policy. See infra notes 125-
149 and accompanying text for discussion of domestic litigation. Informal diplomatic
pressure is also a means by which to attempt to change a government's treatment of its
citizens. See THE DIPLOMACY OF HuMAN RIGHTS 3-12 (David D. Newsom ed., 1986).
9 The primary human rights regimes operate in the regions of Western Europe, the
Americas, Africa, and the Middle East. Burns H. Weston et. al., Regional Human Rights
Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 585-637 (1987).
Though this Note will not discuss the regional regimes, it is important to note that these
regimes play an increasing role in the protection of human rights. Id. at 637. See PAUL
GRAHAM TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE REGIONAL
AND THE GLOBAL PROCESS (1993); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 567-569.
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may inhibit real protection. Perhaps one of the greatest hazards of
independent state action lies in a state's own perception of human
rights. 10 Acting independently, a state may choose which human rights
deserve more protection than others, or more specifically, which rights
are more important than others. Respect for a "common understanding"
of human rights, for which the Declaration calls, may be easily replaced
with a state's own understanding. Thus, a state may create a hierarchy
of human rights, independent of international consensus and the United
Nations.
While the debate regarding a hierarchy of human rights has been
primarily a scholarly one," an Act recently passed by Congress and
signed by the President illustrates how this theoretical concern has very
practical consequences. On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.12 As its title denotes,
the Act legislates a method to combat religious persecution in other
nations.13 In choosing a particular right and developing a special
10 See infra notes 191-173 and accompanying text. See also U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20-23 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer
eds., 1993) [hereinafter U.S. RATIICATION].
11 Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
372, 384 (1989) [hereinafter Meron, State Responsibility]. In a seminar at the American
Society of International Law Proceedings, Professor Meron was asked about the existence
of a hierarchy of human rights and whether the existence of such a hierarchy affected the
use of nonjudicial countermeasures against state violators. He remarked that while
scholars concern themselves with the existence of a hierarchy, governments normally do
not. Instead, governments are concerned with the gravity of the violations. Id.
1 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, _ Stat. _. In May of
1997, Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) introduced the
first version of the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1997 (FFRP) in the House of
Representatives and the Senate, laying the groundwork for the ultimate passage of the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. H.R. 1685, 105th Cong. (1997). S. 772, 105th
Cong. (1997). On September 8, 1998, a second version of the FFRP was introduced in the
House of Representatives. H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997). In March of 1998, Senator Don
Nickles (R-OK) introduced the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. S. 1868, 105th
Cong. (1998). This Senate Bill along with the second version of the FFRP introduced in the
House, would serve as the basis for the Act finally passed by Congress and signed by the
President. On May 14, 1998, the House of Representatives passed the Freedom From
Religious Persecution Act (H.R. 2431), with a vote of 375 - 41. On October 9, 1998, the
Senate passed this Bill with a vote of 98-0. Importantly, though, the Senate passed this Bill
with an amendment proposed by Senator Don Nickles (D-OK) which resembled the Bill (S.
1868) introduced by him earlier that year. S. Amdt. 3789. The House agreed to the Senate's
amendment and the Act was finally signed by the President on October 27,1998.
3 1d. at§ 1.
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method by which to protect it, this Act perhaps unintentionally creates a
hierarchy of human rights with its preference for religious rights.14
Because no international consensus exists regarding which rights are
more important than others, the United States, or any other state creating
a hierarchy, does so in isolation.15 The U.N. Charter and Declaration
clearly stand for the international protection of human rights through the
cooperation of states, as embodied in the United Nations.16 This
cooperation has led to the emergence of a customary law of human
rights.'7 States cannot act to protect human rights without recognizing
that they act within the context of an international effort. A state-created
hierarchy has serious implications for the protection of human rights on
an international level. For a hierarchy undermines the "common
understanding" upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
depends and instead promotes a different understanding based on
subjectivity, thus adversely affecting emerging international
humanitarian customary norms.
Upon the passing of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration, it
seems especially appropriate that discussion take place regarding the
understanding of human rights today. Such discussion necessitates
consideration of a hierarchy of human rights. This Note begins its
discussion with a brief introduction of the background of the United
Nations and its contribution to the development of human rights law. 8
In Section 1II, this Note examines the formation of the customary law of
human rights. 19 Section IV then discusses the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 and studies the debate regarding the existence of a
hierarchy of human rights.20 Finally, Section V will address the Act's
instituting of a hierarchy and its effects on customary international law.21
14 See infra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 172-213 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. One scholar notes that while the Declaration
was not perfect in enumerating human rights, it exists as a tremendous example of
international cooperation. PETER JONES, RIGHTS 85 (1991).
17 See infra notes 87-150 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 22-86 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 87-150 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 151-231 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 232-254 and accompanying text.
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U. THE UNITED NATIONS' CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROTECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The concept of "human rights" 22 has roots in a variety of sources,2A3
including religion,24 natural law,25 legal positivism, 26 and Marxism.27
These influences have worked together to create what we now consider
"human rights," in other words, the "rights one possesses by virtue of
being human." 28 Though theories regarding human rights were integral
22 The term "human rights" is a relatively new term on the world scene and in many ways
has come to replace the term "natural rights." Jones, supra note 16, at 81.
23 See Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 74 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 21-28 (discussing a theory for human rights, including the
influences of Natural Law, Marxism, Utilitarianism, and Morality); U.S. RATIFICATION,
supra note 10, at 5-7 (briefly charting the historical development of human rights
principles); MOSES MOSKOWrrz, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 9-12
(1974) (discussing the need for a central theme to emerge from the many influences on the
international concern for human rights so that goals and objectives for the movement can
be defined); see also MICHAEL FREEDEN, RIGHTS 12-23 (1991) (surveying the most influential
thinkers on rights talk, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Edmund Burke, Thomas
Paine, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Hill Green, and Karl Marx).
24 Shestack, supra note 23, at 75-81. Religious doctrine (from the Judeo-Christian tradition
as well as other religions with a deistic foundation) has contributed to the development of
human rights in its views regarding the relationship between humans and God. Id. at 76.
Believing that humans are created in God's image, human rights come from a divine source
and are therefore inalienable. Id.
2 Id. at 77. While theologians found authority for human rights in God, those adhering to a
theory of natural law found authority for human rights in "elementary principles of
justice." Id. In other words, natural law gives humans certain unchangeable rights.
Though natural law can be viewed as part of the law of God, as Thomas Aquinas viewed it,
the development of natural law was an effort to separate such rights from religion. Id.
Natural law emphasizes the autonomous nature of human beings. Id. at 81. Natural law
theory led to natural rights theory. John Locke was a champion of natural rights theory, as
evident in his view of the relationship between humans and government. Id. at 78.
26 If natural law was the most popular theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
legal positivism has enjoyed such status during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth
centuries. For the Positivist, the source of rights is found only in the enactments of the
state. No higher authority exists. Rights are rights because the state says so. Shestack,
supra note 23, at 79.
27 Finally, Marxism bases its view of rights on the belief that persons are "indivisible from
the social whole." Id. at 82. In other words, Marx believed that human rights, specifically
civil and political rights, separate one human from another, thus isolating the human from
the community. FREEDEN, supra note 23, at 21-22 (1991). Marxism would later especially
advance economic and social rights. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. Another
scholar notes that the concept of human rights had its beginnings as a political concept,
holding that the individual has a "sphere of freedom" from the state. Theodore van Boven,
Distinguishing Human Rights, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43,
49 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982).
28 van Boven, supra note 27, at 74. Another scholar notes the close relationship between the
terms "natural rights" and "human rights." Human rights may be thought of as natural
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to their recognition and development, perhaps the event which most
brought human rights to the forefront of the world scene was the Second
World War.29
The reality of World War II and the atrocities suffered by millions
awakened the world's nations to the realization that human rights are
central to humanity's very survival.3° As people around the world
rights because they are rights everyone has, regardless of whether the state recognizes
them. In addition, human rights may be considered natural rights in that human beings
possess these rights in their "natural capacity," rather than as citizens of any state. JONES,
supra note 16, at 81-82. At the same time, however, human rights differ from natural rights
in important ways, including that natural rights are often considered absolute while human
rights are primafacie and that though new natural rights cannot emerge, human rights are
often said to come into being. J. Roland Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Rights -
A General View, in HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (. ROLAND PENNOCK & JOHN W. CHAPMAN eds., 1981).
It is helpful to consider what is meant by the word "right." Donnelly notes that the word
"right" has two meanings. First, "right" may refer to "rectitude," or "something being
right." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY OR PRACTICE 10 (1989)
[hereinafter DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS]. Second, "right" may refer to
entitlement, or "someone having a right." Id. In human rights, "right" of course refers to
having a right, but at the same time may also have the connotation that it is right or correct
to have such a "right." DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 20. See
generally Shestack, supra note 23, at 70-74 (briefly reviewing other notions of the word
"right").
29 While human rights thought has its beginnings in the years prior to World War II, it was
primarily a subject only for national regulation. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of
International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 4
(Hurst Hannum ed., 1984). Even though human rights were primarily internal, some
events pushed human rights onto the global scene prior to the Second World War as well.
Id. The antislavery movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, beginning with
the Treaty of Paris (1814) and culminating in the adoption of the International Slavery
Convention (1926), brought the treatment of individuals and certain ethnic groups to the
world's attention. Bums Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 22 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bums Weston eds, 2d ed.
1992). Workers' rights were recognized with the establishment of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in 1919. Bilder, supra at 5. In 1900, the Supreme Court of the United
Stated recognized the existence of an international law pertaining to prizes of war. The
Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). After reviewing the practice of nations, the
Supreme Court held that it is a rule of international law that a coastal fishing vessel,
honestly pursuing its "peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish," is exempt
from capture as a prize of war. Id. The Court's holding is especially important in its
recognition that the humane treatment of civilians in times of war was of international
concern. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 69.
30 DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 6. Donnelly writes, "Often a
problem becomes a subject of international action only after a dramatic event crystallizes
awareness . .. The catalyst that made human rights an issue in world politics was the
Holocaust, the systematic murder of millions of innocent civilians by Germany during
World War II." Id. Not only did Hitler's atrocities act as a "catalyst," but so too the
"unfettered sovereignty" which Germany asserted. FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1990). Arguing that the treatment of its
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watched war criminals be convicted and punished for unspeakable
wrongs, 31 the international community could no longer ignore that the
denial of human rights caused the death of millions. Not only did the
War force people to face the past, but it also caused people to look to the
future and ask the question, "How can the world ensure that such crimes
against humanity will never happen again?" From this sentiment, a
desire emerged for the development of international standards for the
protection of human rights.32
A. The United Nations Charter
In the aftermath of the War, the creation of the United Nations
represented the states' intention to face certain challenges as an
international community.33 One of these challenges was the protection
of human rights.34 In its Charter, the United Nations pledges to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, and
religion."35
Though the Charter does not devote lengthy or specific discussion
to human rights,36 one cannot minimize the importance of the document
in the development of human rights protection. For, in its suggestion
that human rights are of international concern, the Charter legitimized
the struggle for human rights.37 In taking responsibility to protect
citizens were not of international concern, Germany carried out its atrocities in the face of a
world reluctant to intervene. Id. World War Il proved that human rights cannot solely be a
domestic issue and international protection is needed. Id.
31 Sohn, supra note 2, at 10. Professor Sohn notes that the Nazi party leaders and military
officials on trial for the atrocities committed during the War were not allowed to use the
defense that they acted for the state or merely followed orders. Id. Thus, international law
was concerned with both the acts of sovereigns and the acts of individuals. Id. See STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 2, at 99-102; DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
3, at 7.
32Bilder, supra note 29, at 5.
3 See supra text and accompanying note 16.
34 Bilder, supra note 29 at 5; DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 7.
m U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, at art. 55(c).
36 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 118. The phrase "human rights" occurs in the
following provisions of the U.N. Charter: preamble, para. 2; art. 1(3); art. 13(1)(b); art. 55;
art. 56; art. 62 (2); art. 68. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 119.
37 Professor Henkin remarks that the end of the War brought acceptance of "human rights"
in two ways. On a national level, constitutions and laws incorporated human rights. On a
"transactional" level, human rights were either incorporated into or the actual subject of
international agreements. The UN Charter was one of these international documents,
stating and solidifying international concern for human rights. Louis Henkin, International
Human Rights as "Rights", in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 258.
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human rights, the Charter placed human rights on the world's agenda.
Importantly, just as the United Nations had an obligation to promote
human rights, so too did each of the member states have the duty to
observe and protect human rights.38 Human rights, then, were no longer
abstract principles, but legitimate, tangible goals for which the
international community was to strive.
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Because the Charter did not have much to say specifically regarding
human rights, there was an obvious need to draft a document solely
dedicated to a discussion of human rights.39 To respond to this need and
pursuant to Article 68 of the Charter,4° the United Nations General
Assembly created the Human Rights Commission in 1946 to make
reports and draft proposals for an "International Bill of Rights." 41 In
Commission discussions, members voiced their concern for the form that
the Bill of Rights was to take, some fearing that a treaty form would
legally bind their nations and infringe on national sovereignty. 42 For this
reason, many wanted the Bill of Rights to be in the form of a
declaration.43 While not legally binding on states, a declaration is a
recommendation made by the General Assembly to member states and is
38 In Article 56, members states "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set fort in Article
55." U.N. CHARTER, art. 56. Article 55 states that the United Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, at art. 55 (a)(b)(c).
3U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 10, at 7. In fact, when the states convened in San Francisco
to sign the U.N. Charter, the United States and several other countries proposed that a Bill
of Human Rights be included in the Charter. Though this proposal was unsuccessful,
Article 68 of the Charter provides for the creation of a commission on human rights. Id.
40 Article 68 states, "The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic
and social fields and for the promotion of human rights..." U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, at
art. 68.
41 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 119. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights first
met in early 1947 and consisted of representatives from member states. Id. Eleanor
Roosevelt, the representative from the United States, served as the chairperson of the
Commission. Tom J. Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than a Whimper,
Less Than a Roar, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNrrY: IssuEs AND ACION 227,
228 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed., 1992).
4 Farer, supra note 41, at 229. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for discussion of
treaties.
4 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 119.
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intended to exert a moral and political influence.44 The Commission
chose the latter, and drafted the document to be non-binding on member
states.45
With forty-eight states voting in favor, the General Assembly
adopted the Declaration in 1948. 46 Though the Declaration did not
enunciate the rights with exacting specificity, 47 it did include those
human rights widely accepted and agreed upon at the time, including
both civil and political rights, and economic and social rights.48 With its
adoption, the Declaration became the primary human rights instrument
in the world, despite its non-binding nature.49 The Declaration was the
first of three parts to the International Bill of Rights.50 Because the
Declaration outlined general principles of human rights, a second, more
detailed and comprehensive document was to be drafted after the
44 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 119.
45 There was little confusion regarding the non-binding nature of the Declaration. Before
the General Assembly cast its final vote, Eleanor Roosevelt stated:
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that
we keep dearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty; it
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a
statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General
Assembly by formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples of all nations.
5 MARJORIE MILLACE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965).
46 See supra note 2.47 Arguably, the drafters as well as the U.N. General Assembly were in no position to be too
specific or definite regarding the content of human rights. Drafted only three years after
the U.N. Charter created the United Nations, the Declaration had to elicit support from
governments and nations with very different ideologies and cultures. JONES, supra note 16,
at 85.
48 Political and civil rights provided for in the Declaration include: equality before the law,
(Article 7); protection against arbitrary arrest (Article 9); the right to a fair trial (Article 10);
freedom from ex post facto criminal laws (Article 11(2)); the right to own property (Article
17); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); freedom of opinion and
expression (Article 19); and freedom of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20).
Economic and social rights provided for in the Declaration include: the right to work and
to choose one's work (Article 23(1)); the right to equal pay for equal work (Article 23(2));
the right to form and join trade unions (Article 23(3)); the right to rest and leisure (Article
24); the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 25); and the right to education
(Article 26). Universal Declaration, supra note 1.49 See infra note 123.
50 John P. Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century,
in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 75, 85 (Maarten Bos ed.,
1973).
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Declaration. This second instrument was to be a covenant, while the
third was to provide for measures of implementation.5 1
Upon completion of the first phase of the International Bill of Rights,
the Commission turned its sights to the second. With the Declaration as
a "springboard," 52 the Commission began discussion regarding the
covenant which was to follow the Declaration. 53 It proved difficult for
the Commission to draft a single document which could adequately
transform the broad principles of the Declaration into a more specific
listing.-4 Recognizing this difficulty, the Commission decided to divide
the rights enumerated in the Declaration into two categories: civil and
political rights,5 5 and economic and social rights.56 To sufficiently treat
these two groupings, the General Assembly, in 1952, decided to place
them into two different covenants, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.57
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Though the Commission completed its work on the two covenants
in 1954, the General Assembly did not approve the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) until
1966.-8 The United States Senate, however, did not ratify the ICCPR until
51 Id.
5 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 120.
5 Humphrey, supra note 50, at 85. The second instrument of the Bill of Rights was intended
to be a treaty which made the rights contained in the Declaration enforceable. Id.; see also
Sohn, supra note 2, at 19.
5 Sohn, supra note 2, at 19. Professor Sohn notes that it was difficult to treat the rights in a
"parallel manner." Id. Equal treatment of rights was especially important due to the states'
differing ideologies regarding rights. Humphrey, supra note 50, at 82. With the emergence
of the Cold War, differences in ideology split the United Nations in half: the West often
championed civil and political rights while the East focused on economic and social rights.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 120. See U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 10, at 7-8.
55 See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
57 Humphrey, supra note 50, at 86. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 120; U.S.
RATIFICATION, supra note 10, at 7-8; Sohn, supra note 2, at 19. A "covenant" is a treaty in
that it binds the state parties according to its terms and subject to reservations. STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 2, at 123. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for discussion of
treaties.
5 Humphrey, supra note 50, at 86.
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1992.59 The United States' ratification seems to have come especially late
when one considers the rights at issue in the ICCPR. For, many of the
rights promoted in the ICCPR are rights often thought to be
"American."60
Substantively, the ICCPR obligates a state party to treat individuals
in a certain way.61 In Article 2 of the ICCPR, the state party promises to
"respect and ensure to all individuals" the rights recognized in the
Covenant, irrespective of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."62  In its listing of rights, the Covenant assigns different
obligations to different rights. Those rights which state parties are
obligated to observe at all times are called non-derogable rights.63
Certain non-derogable rights include: the "inherent right to life," 64 the
right to be free from torture,65 freedom from slavery,66 and "freedom of
5 U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 10, at 20. Though the United States ratified the ICCPR, it
placed a number of reservations on the treaty, thereby restricting its enforceability on the
United States. id. at 269-289.
60 Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WrrH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 20, 23 (Richard Lillich ed.,
1981). Discussing the reservations proposed by the Executive Branch to the ICCPR at the
time, Professor Henkin argues that the ICCPR would make little change in U.S. law. Id. at
22-23. In fact, the ICCPR works to specify American rights. For the rights guaranteed in the
ICCPR are those championed in the American as well as the French Revolutions. Sohn,
supra note 2, at 17. In 1976, American colonists signed the Declaration of Independence,
maintaining that all persons have "'inalienable rights.'" Id. In 1789, the French followed
suit, writing the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Id. In this document,
the French maintained the equality of man and held that each man has "natural and
imprescriptible rights." Id. The Western nations' notion of rights, especially evident in the
ideals of the American and French revolutions, was founded on the belief that individuals
are autonomous beings. Shestack, supra note 23, at 82. See generally Louis Henkin,
International Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (discussing
the similarities as well as differences between American and international conceptions of
human rights) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
61 Oscar M. Garibaldi, Obligations Arising from the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 10, at 54. Garibaldi notes that the ICCPR has two
types of obligations, substantive and procedural, which work together to achieve
protection. Id. The ICCPR outlines the procedures for the international oversight of
individual states' adherence to the substantive obligations of the covenant. Id.
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art.
2(1) [hereinafter ICCPRJ. In this provision, the Covenant makes clear the "content of
obligation," the beneficiaries of the obligation, and underscores that the state party is
obliged to honor the rights of all individuals. Id. at 55.
63 Id. at art 4.
4 Id. at art. 6.
65Id. at art 7.
6Id. at art. 8(1).
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thought, conscience and religion." 67 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, however,
provides that state parties may derogate, or suspend, some rights when a
public emergency threatens the life of the state." Finally, states may
limit certain rights when "time[s] of public emergency" threaten the very
life of a state. 69
To enforce these rights, the Covenant stipulates that where a state
party's domestic law does not afford the same protections, the state must
adopt appropriate legislation to give effect to the rights within the
Covenant. 7° In addition to national implementation, the Covenant
provides for international implementation in Article 41.71 The ICCPR
requires that state parties present periodic reports on the enjoyment of
rights recognized in the Covenant and provides for a Human Rights
Committee to hear complaints alleged by one state against another for
failure to comply with the Covenant's obligations. 72
D. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)
In his famous State of the Union Address of 1941, President Franklin
Roosevelt spoke of the "four essential human freedoms," for which the
67 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 18. The rest of the non-derogable rights in the ICCPR
include: no imprisonment based on failure to fulfill a contractual obligation (Article 11),
the nonapplicability of retroactive criminal laws (Article 15), and the right to recognition as
a person before the law (Article 16).
6 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 4(1). While the Covenant does not explicitly state which
rights fit into this category, Professor Sohn has made the following list: "[flreedom from
compulsory labor, right to liberty and security of person, right to humane treatment in
prison, right to certain minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, and freedom from
interference with privacy, family, home..." Sohn, supra note 2, at 18.
6 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 4(1). Such rights include: the rights to liberty of movement
and the freedom to choose one's residence (Article 12), the right to a public hearing (Article
14), freedom to voice one's religious beliefs in public (Article 18(3)), freedom of expression
(Article 19 (2)(3)), right of peaceful assembly (Article 21), and freedom of association
(Article 22).
70 Specifically, the Covenant reads:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 2(2).
7' ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 41.
72 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 41; Sohn, supra note 2, at 22. The Human Rights Committee
only has jurisdiction over a state if it has consented to such jurisdiction. So, in order for a
state to bring a complaint against another, both states must have accepted the Committee's
jurisdiction. Id.
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world at that time could only hope. 73 President Roosevelt called for the
freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom
from want, and finally, for the freedom from fear.74 Specifying what
"freedom from want" meant, he stated, "freedom from want, which,
translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will
secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants
everywhere in the world."75 Little did President Roosevelt know that his
notion of "freedom from want" would be fleshed out in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 76
Among its provisions, the Covenant recognizes the right to work77
and the right to favorable working conditions, 78 and it also protects the
privacy of the family.79 Interestingly, the Covenant not only promotes
the right to education,80 but also outlines the structure of education-
primary, secondary, and higher.81 Unlike the ICCPR, states are not
expected to begin implementing the provisions of the ICESCR upon
ratification of the document.8 2 Recognizing that some states may not be
in a position to realistically promote these rights, the Covenant allows
for their "progressive" realizations 3 In other words, the Covenant
requires that states proceed down the road of realizing these rights in a
way suitable to their condition84
73 President's Message to Congress, 77 CONG. REC. 44, 46-47 (daily ed. Jan. 6,1941).
74Id.
75Id.
76 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. The rights of the ICESCR are often traced to the Russian
Revolution and the rise of the proletariat. Sohn, supra note 2, at 32-33. The Russian
Revolution embodied the Marxist notion that the individual is a part of a greater whole.
For this reason, the needs of the whole may take precedence over those of the individual.
Shestack, supra note 23, at 82. While the United States has signed the ICESCR, it has not yet
ratified the document and is therefore not a member of the treaty. NEWMAN &
WEISWBRODT, supra note 30, at 401.
7 Importantly, the right to work does not mean that a person has an obligation to work,
because such a notion would support forced labor. Sohn, supra note 2, at 45. Rather, the
right to work refers to an individual's free choice of occupation. Id.
78 ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 7.
79 ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 10.
- ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 13.
81 ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 13. Though the Covenant outlines such a structure, it
allows the state parties to implement the right of education as they see fit, as long as the
methods are consistent with the right. ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 14.
82 ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 2(1).
83 Though state parties may wish to sign the Covenant, they may not be in the financial
situation to observe the rights as outlined in the Covenant. Sohn, supra note 2, at 39.
8& Id.
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If the Charter worked to recognize human rights, the Declaration
and two covenants have worked to define them.85 Although the
Declaration was drafted as a non-binding instrument, the two Covenants
were drafted as treaties, and are therefore binding on the state parties.8 6
But the fact that the Covenants created legal obligations only in their
signatories presented a problem: How were principles of international
human rights to become binding on all states? The emergence of a
customary law of human rights has provided a promising answer.
M. HUMAN RIGHTS AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Sources of International Law
International human rights operate within the context of
international law.87 Thus, one must have a working understanding of
the processes of international law before examining human rights in the
context of international law more specifically.8 For the purposes of this
discussion, a short explanation of the primary sources of international
law, including treaty and custom, will provide an adequate background
for examining the development of human rights law.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
states the three primary sources of international law-"international
conventions," "international custom," and "general principles of law."8 9
The first source, "international conventions," refers to treaties that
countries adhere to voluntarily.90 In international law, treaties9 create
international legal obligations with corresponding duties of compliance
and remedies. 92 In order for a document to be a treaty, Article 2 of the
.0 Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 1, 1-2 (1996).
6 Sohn, supra note 2, at 20.
87STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 26.
8Id.
89 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1). Article 38 also states "subsidiary"
sources for defining international law. Subsidiary means include "judicial decisions and
the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations." Art. 38(1)(4)(d).
90 RICHARD LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 93 (3d ed. 1995).
91 Terminology changes when discussing "treaties" in an international setting or in a
United States domestic setting. In international settings, all international agreements are
considered treaties. In the United States, however, the Constitution distinguishes between
international agreements and treaties. For the United States, treaties are agreements
"concluded by the President with the advice and consent, or approval, of two-thirds of the
Senate." International agreements, however, include those agreements the President
concludes on the basis of constitutional authority or a delegation of authority by Congress.
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 8, at 109.
9 Id.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that sovereign
states must be parties, that the treaty must be in writing, and that the
agreement be governed by international law.93 A "party" to a treaty
means a state which has consented to be bound.94 A state party may
accept a treaty, but may make a "reservation" to that treaty, by
qualifying particular provisions with which it disagrees. By so doing,
the state party limits the legal effect of the treaty when applied to that
state.95
The ICJ describes the second source of international law, customary
law, as "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
by law." 96 Perhaps Section 102 of the Restatement (Third) Foreign
Relations Law of the United States clarifies this description, providing in
clause (2): "Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." 97 That is, customary law develops from the consistent
practice of states, coupled with the states' feeling of legal obligation to so
act. Importantly, customary law binds all states. If a state wishes not to
be bound, it must persistently object to the emerging international
norm.
9 8
One scholar remarked that customary law seems as though it
develops "by mistake."99 For states must "happen" to practice the
conduct out of some understanding that it is legally obligated to do so. 100
Though customary law may seem a bit nebulous, international law
consisted primarily of customary rules until recently.101 Generally, the
93Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna
Convention sets forth a set of rules for the formation, interpretation, and termination of
treaties. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 8, at 110. While the United States is not one of the
sixty-five states who is party to the treaty, State Department officials have commented that
its provisions have attained customary law status and are therefore binding. Id.
94 Vienna Convention, supm note 93, at art. 2.
9 Id. at 2(1)(d).
9 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 89, at art. 38(1)(b).
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102.2 (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
9Id.
99 In a class discussion with Professor Richard Stith, Valparaiso University School of Law,
he remarked about the curious nature of customary rules and their seemingly haphazard
way of becoming law. (October 12, 1997).
100 Id.
101 JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 (9th ed. 1984). Customary
rules emerged due to a "long historical process" which culminated in their recognition as
customary law. Id. An example of rules which became law by gaining status as customary
international law are the rules of the "law of the sea." CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 8, at
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use of treaties to create international law has increased, thereby
diminishing the need to identify evolving customary rules in many areas
of law. 10 2 While customary law develops from the daily practice of
countries, the final source of law looks to the principles and laws present
in nations' domestic settings to determine the existence of an
international principle.
The third source of international law as outlined by the ICJ is the
"general principles of law recognized by civil nations." 10 3 When
examining general principles of law to find evidence of international
law, one must look to principles of private law found in domestic
settings °4 General principles of law are most often used in domestic
and international courts when no international law covers a particular
pointles A general principle of law, then, is recognized by examining
domestic settings and determining whether the principle is widely held
by enough states that the principle actually exists on an international
level.
While it may be easy to accept international law made by treaty, law
which develops through custom and recognition of general principles is
often more difficult to bite one's teeth into.(6 Treaty law is certainly a
978. Prior to the twentieth century, most of the law of the sea consisted of customary law.
The customary law which emerged was based on the notion of the freedom of the sea. Id
10 STARKE, supra note 101, at 34. The International Law Commission has worked to codify
much of customary law through its drafting of treaties, such as the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (April 18,1961), the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (April
24,1963), and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 22, 1969). Id. The law of
the sea, once primarily customary law, has also been codified in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982,21 I.L.M. 1261. CARTER & TRIMBLE,
supra note 8, at 977. A number of factors influenced states' desire for the codification of law
of the sea. Concerns for fishing and the possibility of harvesting other valuable resources
from the sea were among the leading factors. Id. at 978.
103 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 89, at art. 38(1)(c).
104 LILLIcH & HANNUM, supra note 90, at 93. General principles of law have been used in
the areas of procedure, evidence, and "machinery of the judicial process," to identify
international law. MALcoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 82, 83 (2d ed. 1986). While
there are differing opinions regarding general principles of law, most agree that the general
principles of law "constitute a separate source of law." Id.
1m LILTICH & HANNUM, supra note 90, at 93. See e.g., the International Court of Justice in
Corfu Channel allowed the use of circumstantial evidence because it is admitted in all
systems of law and recognized by international decisions. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1 (holding that the British navy violated Albanian sovereignty when it
swept for mines within Albanian territorial waters).
106 Paul L. Hoffman, The Blank Stare Phenomenon: Proving Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181 (1995). A human rights litigator, Hoffman describes
the reaction of judges to the introduction of applicable customary law as a "blank stare."
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necessary source of law in the development of international human
rights standards. But, because treaties only bind their state parties,
treaty law by itself cannot ensure the protection of human rights on a
global level.107 For this reason, human rights lawyers and advocates
have looked to other sources of law for human rights' protection. In
recent years, customary law has emerged as a promising source of law
for the development of human rights standards and the protection of
human rights on an international level.108
B. The Emergence of Customary Human Rights Law
Many scholars who comment on the emergence of a customary law
of human rights make note of its unique path to becoming custom. 1°9
Traditionally, customary law develops from the consistent practice of
states and opinio juris, that is, the state's sense of legal obligation to act in
a certain way.110 Evidence of the state practice in the human rights
context, however, differs from the traditional notion of state practice."'
Such evidence, for example, includes the incorporation of human rights
Id. He states that the "judicial skepticism" exists as one of the "largest obstacles" in the
effort to use customary law in domestic jurisdictions. Id. at 182.
107 The most obvious limitation on treaties is that they only legally bind those states
accepting them. Richard J. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic
Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 171, 206. Thus, states with human rights problems will likely
not become parties. Id. A second limitation of treaties is that they "reflect agreement" at
the most minimal level. Id. In other words, the treaties often represent the parties lowest
level of commitment, because the parties would not sign a treaty if they felt they could not
live up to its terms. Thirdly, because of the lack of effective enforcement measures, the
ratification of a treaty may not automatically equal the observance of it. Id. Finally, a state
may ratify a treaty, but may make reservations to that treaty. Reservations to the treaty
will limit the treaty's force in the domestic law of the state. Id.
108 Professor Meron notes the valuable effect of a norm's customary character. First, once a
norm becomes custom, it is governed by international law. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 80 (1989) [hereinafter
HUMANITARIAN NORMS]. Second, once a human rights norm has obtained customary
status, regional human rights organs and treaties referring to the applicability of customary
law will broaden the remedies available to individuals and underscore the importance of
customary law. Id.
109 See generally OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 86-88
(1991) (noting that that the evidence of state practice does not conform to the "traditional
criteria" of evidence of custom); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights
Law: Custom, Jus cogens, and General Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3, 9-11 (Philip Alston
ed., 1996) (contrasting the kind of state practice which has traditionally contributed to
emergence of custom with the kind of state practice contributing to the customary norms of
human rights).
110 Simma & Alston, supra note 109.
M Id. Professor Henkin purports that traditional, or "authentic," customary law was never
made "intentionally, purposefully." Customary law did not develop because states
deliberately acted to form new law. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 142.
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provisions in national constitutions and laws, United Nations
resolutions, statements by national officials criticizing other states for
serious human rights violations, and decisions in national courts using
the Declaration as a source for judicial decision.112 These evidences of
state practice are not "practice" at all, in that they are not deeds of states,
but words of states.113 Professors Simma and Alston refer to this unique
evidence of state practice as "paper practice."11 4 By means of this paper
practice, customary human rights norms have emerged more
deliberately than traditional customary norms. For instead of relying on
the consistent but arbitrary practice of a norm, states have explicitly
stated their adherence to human rights norms in such instruments.
Louis Henkin helps to distinguish between the traditional notion of
state practice and the type of state practice that has led to the formation
of a customary law of human rights.115 Traditionally, state practice has
reflected the international norm.116 Now, however, state practice is an
activity designed to create the norm.117 In other words, though a United
Nations Resolution condemning a particular human rights violation may
not be formally binding on its parties, it is evidence of states' intention to
create a norm to protect this particular right. Thus, "state practice" has
come to include not only the works of states, but also their words and
stated intentions.118 In this way, the customary human rights norms
emerge in a much less arbitrary manner when compared to the
traditional emergence of customary norms. 19 As a result of this unique
112 SCHACHTER, supra note 109, at 88.
13 Simma & Alston, supra note 109, at 10. Rather than rely on patterns of state practice, the
development of a customary law of human rights relies on the "words, texts, [and] votes"
of diplomats and delegates to the United Nations. Id. Professor Henkin also notes that
General Assembly resolutions contribute to the efforts to "create new customary law."
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 142.
114 Simma & Alston, supra note 109, at 10.
115 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 142.
116 Id.
117 Id.
's In order to make sense of this different notion of "state practice" and its relation to opinio
juris, Schachter asserts that to determine whether a certain practice is custom, one must ask,
"Is there a general conviction that particular conduct is internationally unlawful?"
SCHACHTER, supra note 109, at 89. Thus, Schachter addresses the issue of state practice in
his mention of "general conviction" and the issue of opinio juris in the phrase
"internationally unlawful." It is helpful to keep this in mind when examining human
rights obligations that are mentioned in the Declaration and now considered customary
international law.
119 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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sort of state practice, a number of human rights norms have achieved
status as customary law.120
C. Content of Customary Law of Human Rights
Though some assert that the Declaration has achieved customary
law status, no true consensus exists on the customary nature of the
Declaration in its entirety.121 Seventeen years after the adoption of the
Universal Declaration, Judge Humphrey Waldock asserted that the
document had achieved status as customary law.122 Though Judge
Waldock's statement came too early to be true, he foreshadowed the
strong influence the Declaration would have in affecting the formation of
customary human rights law.123
A long list of rights contained in the Declaration have attained
customary law status. 124 Norms which have achieved customary law
status, as recognized by United States courts, include prohibitions
against arbitrary detention, 125 summary execution or murder,126 causing
1 See infra notes 121-150 and accompanying text.
121 Professor Sohn states, "The Declaration, as an authoritative listing of human rights, has
become a basic component of international customary law, binding on all states, not only
members of the United Nations." Sohn, supra note 2, at 17. See Lillich, supra note 85, at 2-3
(citing others who believe that the Declaration has become customary international law).
Others, however, maintain that while some rights have achieved status as customary law, a
"careful analysis of the relevant state practice" does not support the notion that all rights
have acquired customary status. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN A NUTSHELL 32 (1988). Though the Declaration has achieved a "moral authority such that
it has almost become legally binding," the Declaration as a whole does not bind states.
Imre Szabo, Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments, in 1 THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10, 33 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds.,
1982).
2 Humphrey Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance
of the European Convention, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 15 (INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. SUPP. No. 11, 1965).
123 Just eleven years after the Declaration's adoption, another scholar noted the important
influence of the Declaration, despite the fact that it was drafted as a non-binding
instrument. Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
International and National Law, 53 AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L. PROC. 217 (1959). First, the
Declaration was used as a "yardstick" by governments, international conferences, and
others, to gauge the observation of human rights. Id. at 219. Second, other treaties referred
to the Declaration, thereby noting its influence. Id. Thirdly, the Declaration had an
influence on "national constitutions... municipal legislation and, in some instances, on
court decisions." Id. at 222.
124 See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
125 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980) (holding that the arbitrary
detention of a refugee is prohibited by customary international law."), affd sub nom
Rodriguiz-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F. 2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Like the Filartiga court,
the court in Fernandez looked to the Universal Declaration, the American Convention on
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the disappearance of individuals, 127 cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment,128 and genocide.129 This list along with other classes of human
rights, including the prohibition against slavery, systemic racial
discrimination, and a consistent pattern of gross violations of
international human rights, are considered customary law and
purported as such in § 702 of the Restatement.13° The Restatement also
notes that systematic religious discrimination on the basis of state policy,
the right to property, and gender discrimination are emerging norms of
customary law.' 31 In addition to the rights considered custom, the
Human Rights, the European Convention, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as evidences of the customary norm against arbitrary detention. Fernandez,
505 F. Supp. at 796-98.
12 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that summary
execution or murder by the state is violative of customary international law). The court
dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action, which alleged that causing the disappearance of a
person constituted a violation of customary international law for failure to state a claim. Id.
at 1543. The court reasoned that the elements needed to make a claim for causing the
disappearance of an individual were unclear. Id. The plaintiff then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. See infra note 127.
17 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the disappearance
of an individual violates customary international law). The court examined several
statements submitted by legal scholars, purporting that universal consensus did exist as to
the elements of "disappearance." Id. at 709. The two elements of disappearance include
abduction by the state and refusal of the state to acknowledge the abduction. Id. at 710.
The court also looked to the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, statements of the General Assembly and the Organization of American
States, and the Restatement. Id.
128 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185-89 (D. Mass. 1995) (recognizing that the
customary law forbidding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment exists, but holding that
the plaintiff's constructive expulsion from his native Guatemala did not constitute a
violation of that norm).
129 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that genocide violates customary
international law, the court held that the defendant, leader of the Bosnian-Serbs, violated
customary international law when he ordered the murder, rape, forced impregnation, and
other forms of torture, of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims). The court noted that the
prohibition of genocide "quickly achieved" acceptance as the law of nations following the
atrocities of World War II. Id. at 241. It looked to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, noting that the norm applies to private individuals
as well. Id.
130 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 702(b)(f)(g).
131 Id. § 702 com. (j)(k)(l). While U.S. courts have limited their recognition of those norms
now considered custom to those listed in the Restatement, other rights have likely reached
status as general principles of law. Through examination of national laws, governmental
and scholarly statements, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has cited the
right to self determination of peoples and the individual's right to leave and return to one's
country as norms which can now be considered general principles. SCHACHTER, supra note
109, at 90. Specific to the emerging norm of religious freedom, Professor Meron notes that
a specific convention on the issue of religious freedom would aid in defining the content of
the right and in "expedit[ing] its passage into the general corpus of customary law."
MERON, HUMANTrARIAN NORMS, supra note 108, at 95.
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prohibition against torture has been recognized as achieving customary
law status in United States courts. 132 A brief review of Filartiga v. Pena,133
which recognized the prohibition against torture as customary law, will
provide a helpful example for understanding how a United States court
recognizes customary law.
In Filartiga v. Pena, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the prohibition against torture and other cruel
and inhuman treatment is recognized as customary law.134 Brought
under the Alien Tort Statute,13s Filartiga involved an action brought by
two Paraguayan plaintiffs against another Paraguayan citizen for the
torture and death of their son and brother. 136 The statute gives a United
States District Court original jurisdiction over any civil tort action
brought by an alien and committed in violation of either the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.137 Thus, plaintiffs could have
used customary international law or treaty law to establish jurisdiction
under the statute. Because the United States had not yet ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which explicitly
prohibits torture,138 the plaintiffs relied on customary law for a
prohibition.139
The court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that customary law
prohibited torture.140 Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the
Filartiga court stated that the "law of nations 'may be ascertained by
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing the law.' ' 141 Beginning with the United
Nations Charter, 142 the Filartiga court then looked to various Declarations
of the United Nations 43 which prohibited torture. The court examined
i See infra notes 133-147 and accompanying text.
33 Filartiga v. Pena, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13 Id. at 884.
M3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
13 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79.
13 Id. at 880. Under the Alien Tort Statute, universal consensus must exist as to the binding
nature and content of the tort. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
'm See supra note 59.
139 Filartiga v. Pena, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
14 Id. at 884.
141 Id. at 880 n. 2 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-161 (1820)).
142 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. The court stated that while the Charter did not define what
was meant by its phrase "human rights and fundamental freedoms," there was no dissent
that this phrase guaranteed, at a minimum, the right to be free from torture. Id. at 882.
143 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882. The court explained its examination of the declarations by
stating that the declarations specify "with great precision the obligations of the member
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the Universal Declaration1 " and the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.14 The court also reviewed
international agreements, including the American Convention on
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 146 From an examination of these documents,
the Court determined that the prohibition of torture is "clear and
unambiguous."1 47
An examination of Filartiga is helpful when trying to understand a
norm's recognition as customary international law. As Filartiga
illustrates, the court reviews the relevant international documents in
order to ascertain consensus regarding a human rights norm. 148 Without
consensus, as evidenced through such documents, a norm will not
achieve status as a customary norm.149
The importance of the emerging customary law of human rights
cannot be underestimated. Customary law binds all states to adhere to
these human rights obligations, regardless of whether they are parties to
any treaty protecting these rights.15° States who act to protect human
rights inside or outside their borders operate against this backdrop of
emerging customary law of human rights. In other words, state action
not only contributes to the formation of custom, but also operates within
custom. Individual state action in the protection of human rights works
within this context. Every state operates within this context when it
legislates in the area of internationally recognized norms. Thus, the
United States acts against the backdrop of an emerging customary law of
human rights with its introduction of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998.
nations under the Charter." Id. at 883. It furthered stated that declarations create the
expectation that states will adhere to the rights provided for in the declarations. Id.
144 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882. The court noted that the Declaration explicitly states, "no one
shall be subjected to torture." Id.
'45 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-883. The court gave special attention to this instrument, which
not only provides that states cannot permit torture, but also defines torture and states that
any victim of torture should be given redress according to national laws. Id. at 883.
146 Filartiga v. Pena, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
147 Id. at 884.
'4 See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
14 9 See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
o
50 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT AND ITS
HIERARCHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The United States has contributed to the promotion of human rights
through its participation in the United Nations 51 and independent
action. The U.S. has attempted the latter through its inclusion of human
rights in the baggage of considerations for foreign policy.15 2 Though the
President is the United States' representative in foreign relations and the
ultimate determiner of foreign policy,1 53 Congress has acted to secure
151 In addition to its signing of the U.N. Charter and its signing and ratifying of the
Universal Declaration and the ICCPR, the United States has become a member to a number
of U.N. sponsored treaties, including the following: Convention to Suppress the Slave
Trade and Slavery, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, (entered into force Dec. 7, 1927) (entered
into force for U.S. Mar. 21, 1929); Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, 182 U.N.T.S.
51, (entered into force Dec. 7, 1953) (entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956);
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force April 30, 1957) (entered
into force for U.S. Dec. 6, 1967); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S.
136, (entered into force July 7, 1954) (entered into force for the U.S. July 7, 1976); Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967)
(entered into force for U.S. Nov. 1, 1968); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (entered into force Jan. 12,1951) (entered into force
for the U.S. Feb. 23,1989); Four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of Armed
Conflict, adopted August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
(entered into force for U.S. Feb. 2, 1956).
152 U.S. general legislation affording human rights influence in formation of foreign policy
includes: Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 § 32, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973)
(declared the "sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military
assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or
imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes," thereby expressing a more
general human rights concern); Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 § 502B, Pub. L. No. 93-559,
88 Stat. 1795 (1974) (stating the "sense of Congress ...that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to
any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights); International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849 (codified in scattered sections 7, 22 of U.S.C.) (tying the
receipt of economic assistance to a human rights standard); International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 § 502B, Pub. L. No. 94329, 22 U.S.C. 2304
(1976) (declaring that a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to
promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights, instructing
the President to formulate military aid programs to promote human rights, providing for
the termination or restriction of security assistance to any country "engag[ing] in a
consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights," requiring
that the Administration report to Congress on the human rights situation in each country
receiving security assistance).
15 For discussion regarding the relationship between the Executive and Congress in
making foreign policy based on human rights concerns, see Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning
U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246; DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 242-246; DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99-117.
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human rights concerns in foreign policy by passing legislation requiring
the President to consider foreign states' human rights records in our
dealings them.M In the past, Congress has enacted legislation which
provides a general structure "within which the Executive is to shape
security and development programs."ls Not only has Congress enacted
laws of general applicability, but also country-specific legislation which
aims to address violations of human rights within a given country.'5
Most recently, Congress has passed and the President has signed the
"International Religious Freedom Act of 1998," in an effort to hinder the
growth of religious persecution on a global level.15 The end goal of the
Act-the curbing of religious persecution-certainly deserves attention,
admonition, and action. The means for achieving this goal, however,
implicitly place religious freedom above all other rights.
A. The Provisions of the Act
The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) begins by stating
that the freedom of religion is a "universal human right and
fundamental freedom" and cites several international agreements
recognizing this right. 158 In order to remedy religious persecution, the
154 Donald Fraser, Congress' Role in the Making of International Human Rights Policy, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERIcAN FOREIGN POLICY 247 (Donald P. Kommers & Gilburt D.
Loescher eds., 1979). Representative Fraser (D-Minn) was the first Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. He remarks that Congress
has a special role to play in the protection of human rights, because it has the power to
raise public awareness as well as set standards for the Executive Branch to follow when
using "the various assistance programs for leverage in the promotion of human rights." Id.
155 Id. at 248. Such legislation is called "general legislation," in that it gives the Executive
more breathing room, by only providing standards for the Executive to follow. For
examples of "general legislation," see supra note 152.
156 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Linking Security Assistance and Human Rights, in
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 838. Country specific legislation can have some
advantages over general legislation. Country specific legislation can be tailored to the
specific set of circumstances in the "target" country. Id. Such legislation also allows the
possibility to reward the country with security assistance based on the progress of its
human rights record, instead of only punishing the country for the violation. Id. An
example of country specific legislation is Section 728 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981. Id. This piece of legislation applied to El Salvador
in response to the government's killing of thousands of civilians in 1981. Id. It required the
President to certify on a continual basis that El Salvador met four conditions, dealing with
recognition of human rights and treatment of citizens. Id.
1 7 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, _ Stat..
158 Id. at. § 2(a)(2). In Section 2, the bill cites to the following international agreements: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the United Nations Charter, and the
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Act establishes a new "Office on International Religious Freedom" in the
Department of State.15 9 The head of this Office, the "Ambassador at
Large," will work to identify and report violations of religious freedom
abroad, and make policy recommendations regarding the United States'
response to such violations.16° The Act also creates the "United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom," as well as the position
of a Special Adviser on International Religious Freedom within the
National Security Council.1 61 While the Commission will review
violations of religious freedom and make policy recommendations to the
President, the Secretary of State, and Congress, the Special Adviser will
exist as a resource for executive branch officials on the issue of religious
freedom violations, make policy recommendations, and act as a liason
with the Ambassador, the Commission, Congress, and nongovernmental
organizations. 162 Once it is determined that a country has violated the
right of religious freedom, either through tolerating or engaging in such
violations, the Act authorizes the President to take certain action in an
effort to promote religious freedom.163 With these provisions, the Act
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id.
at § 2 (a)(2).
159 Id. at § 101(a).
160 Id. at § 101(c). Specifically, under the leadership of a President-appointed and Senate-
approved Ambassador at Large, the Office will assist the Secretary of State in preparing the
portions of the Human Rights Reports which address religious freedom. Id. at § 102(a). In
addition, the Ambassador will aid the Secretary of State in preparing an Annual Report on
Religious Freedom to be transmitted to Congress which will supplement the Human Rights
Reports. Id. at § 102(b). The Ambassador will also fulfill advisory and diplomatic roles,
advising the President and Secretary of State on appropriate United States response to
religious freedom violations and using diplomatic means to address violations abroad. Id.
at § 101(c)(2)(3).
161 Int'l Religious Freedom Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-242, _ Stat. _ §§201, 301. The
Commission consists of three President-appointed members, three President-appointed
members on the recommendation of the Senate, and three members appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. Id. at § 202(b)(1)(B). None of these members can
be officers or employees of the United States. Id. The Ambassador at Large is also a
member of the Commission, though not a voting member. Id. at § 201(b)(1)(A).
162 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, - Stat. - §§ 202(a),
301.
163Id. at §§ 401, 402, 403, 404, 405. With help from the Secretary of State, the Ambassador at
Large, the Special Adviser, and the Commission, the President shall determine the proper
action to be taken. Id. at § 401(b)(1). The Act provides the President a list of possible
actions, including the following:
(1) A private demarche; (2) An official public demarche; (3) A public
condemnation; (4) A public condemnation within one or more
multilateral fora; (5) The delay or cancellation of one or more scientific
exchanges; (6) The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural
exchanges; (7) The denial of one or more working, official, or state
visits; (8) The delay or cancellation of one or more working, official, or
state visits; (9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United
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creates a specific system with which to handle violations of religious
freedom.
No doubt, religious freedom is certainly recognized as an
international human right.164 One scholar remarked, "Freedom of
States development assistance in accordance with section 116 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; (10) Directing the Export-Import Bank
of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or
the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any
... guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participation in the
extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency,
instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be
responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; (11) The
withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security
assistance in accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961; (12) Consistent with section 701 of the International
Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing the United States executive
directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote
against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government,
agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the
President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; (13)
Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to
issue any . . .specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific
authority ... to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign
government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined
by the president to be responsible for violations under section 401 or
402 ... ; (14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from
making loans or providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in
any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency,
instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be
responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; (15) Prohibiting the
United States Government from procuring, or entering into any
contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign
government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President
to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402.
Id. at § 405 (a)(1)-(15). The President may take commensurate action in substitution for the
specifically listed actions and must notify the Congress of such a decision. Id. at § 405(b).
In addition, the Act provides that the President may enter into a binding agreement with
the foreign state who violates religious freedom. Id. at 405(c). If the President decides to
take particular action, listed as actions (9)-(15) of section 405(a) above, the President must
consult with the foreign state's government prior to taking such action. Id. at § 403(a), (b).
Also prior to such action, the President must report to Congress regarding the intention for
such action. Id. at § 404. The Act also provides for Presidential action responding to states'
particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Ld. at § 402.
164 Religious freedom as a human right is recognized in the following United Nations
documents: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 2, 18, 26, and 29;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, art. II (providing that the five acts constituting genocide are "committed with
intent to destroy, in whole, or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such
.... "); the Geneva Conventions, supra note 151, at common art. 3, art. 16, 34-37 of the Third
Convention, and art. 27 of the Fourth Convention; the International Covenant on Civil and
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religion is indeed the oldest of the internationally recognized human
freedoms and therefore the one with which the international community
has had the longest experience." 16 Even still, religious persecution
remains a formidable foe on the world scene. 166 For this reason, the
emerging customary norm of religious freedom represents an
encouraging step in fighting violations of this right. The International
Religious Freedom Act seeks to contribute to the protection of religious
freedom,167 but in its effort to make this contribution, the Act creates a
preference for religious freedom and institutes its own hierarchy of
human rights.
B. A Legislated Hierarchy With Religious Freedom First
Though the Act does not expressly state that it places religious
freedom at the top of a hierarchy of human rights, the method by which
the Act seeks to protect religious freedom does just that. In a hearing of
the House Committee on International Relations discussing an initial
version of a bill to address religious persecution, the Freedom From
Religious Persecution Act, Secretary John Shattuck remarked,
[T]he [Freedom From Religious Persecution Act] would
create a de facto hierarchy of human rights violations
under U.S. law that would severely damage our efforts
to ensure that all aspects of basic civil and political
Political Rights, supra note 50, at art. 18, 20, 27; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 61, at art. 13(1), 2(2); the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.; the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N.Doc.
A/36/51 (existing as the most important international instrument for religious rights)
[hereinafter, Declaration Against All Forms of Intolerance]. For excellent explanation of
these documents and their role in the international protection of religious rights, see
generally Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in 2 RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS N GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Johan D. van der Vyver &
John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief
Through the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82
AM. J. INT'L. L. 487 (1988).
165 John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 60, at 171, 176.
16 In his introduction of the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act, a precursor version
to the passing of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Representative Frank
Wolf stated that religious persecution has "persisted and accelerated ... while the world
and the United States have turned their efforts elsewhere." 105 CONG. REc. E996-E997
(daily ed. May 21, 1997) (extension of remarks of Rep. Frank R. Wolf). For review of the
bills that led to the passing of the IFRA, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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rights, including religious freedom, are protected. It
would differentiate between acts motivated by religious
discrimination and similar acts based on other forms of
repression or bias, such as denial of political freedom, or
racial or ethnic hatred. In doing so, the bill would
legislate a hierarchy of human rights into our laws. 168
By creating an office to monitor religious persecution, establishing a
Commission and a position in the National Security Council, and
specifically providing for action to be taken in response to states'
violations of religious freedom, the Act distinguishes among human
rights. In so doing, it establishes a hierarchy of human rights within U.S.
law. As Secretary Shattuck notes, legislating a hierarchy has an impact
on national law. 169 But a hierarchy, such as that legislated by the IFRA,
operates within an international context as well. Before analyzing its
place in the international context, though, it is important to examine the
problem regarding the existence of a hierarchy of human rights.
C. The Debate Regarding the Existence of a Hierarchy of Human Rights
1. Fundamental Rights vs. Ordinary Rights
The quest to identify a hierarchy of human rights often begins with
an attempt to distinguish between fundamental and ordinary human
rights. 17° The task of discerning which rights are fundamental and which
are not has proved to be a difficult one. An examination of United
Nations documents provides little help. As Professor Meron notes, the
terms "human rights," "freedoms," "fundamental human rights,"
"fundamental freedoms," "rights and freedoms," and "human rights and
fundamental freedoms" are used interchangeably throughout U.N.
human rights instruments.171 The vocabulary and language of these
168 Freedom From Religious Persecution Act, 1997: Markup on H.R. 1685 Before the House Comm.
on International Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of John Shattuck, Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dpt. of State).
Though this quote was made in the context of another version of a bill to address religious
persecution, for the purposes of this Note, Secretary Shattuck's concerns are just as relevant
for the IRFA. For his remarks concern the effect of legislation which creates a method to
deal with the violation of one right but not others.
'6 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
70 Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1986) [hereinafter
On a Hierarchy].
171 Id. The instruments and provisions containing these phrases include the following: the
Charter of the United Nations (the Preamble, Articles 1(3), 13(b), 55(c), 62(2), 76(c)), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Preamble, Articles 2, 29(2), 30), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 2(1), 3, 5(1), 5(2)), the
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international instruments make no distinction between ordinary human
rights and fundamental human rights.
Though this is true, the attempt to identify fundamental human
rights continues.172 Comment M to § 703 of the Restatement states that
while all the rights of the Universal Declaration and the Covenants are
internationally recognized human rights, some rights are fundamental to
human dignity.17 3 Thus, when these rights are consistently violated, a
violation of customary international law has occurred.1 74 Comment M
lists the rights it considers fundamental, but provides no guidelines for
determining which rights could be considered fundamental. 7 5
Furthermore, there is no international agreement regarding the listed
rights as fundamental in the Restatement.176
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the
Preamble, Article 1(1)), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (the Preamble, Articles 1, 3). Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra
note 170, at 5.
172 See van Boven, supra note 27, at 43. Professor van Boven notes that modem human
rights thinking holds to the indivisibility of human rights which views human rights as a
"single package" and therefore incapable of ranking. Id. Even so, he asserts that some
rights have a "supra-positive" character. Id. These rights, he argues, lie at the "foundation
of the international community . . . represented in the United Nations and, in a more
limited sense, in other important worldwide and regional organizations." Id. at 48.
Evidence of these rights is found in special procedures established by other international
organizations, such as the International Labor Organization, to promote fundamental
rights. Id. at 46. Additional evidence includes international penal law as well as
resolutions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council which give guidance to the
fundamental nature of certain rights. Id. at 47-48. Still, Professor van Boven notes that the
differing implementation measures of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, do not
automatically suggest that civil and political rights are fundamental, while economic, social
and cultural are not. Id. at 48-53. He states that the "gradual progress" of implementing
rights is actually part of the "whole human rights area." Id. at 53. So, while van Boven
asserts that supra-positive rights exist, he fails to reveal which rights have such character.
173 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 702 ant. m.
174 Id.
175 Comment M states that the following rights are "fundamental": systematic harassment,
invasions of privacy in the home, arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of fair trial in
criminal cases, grossly disproportionate punishment, denial of freedom to leave a country,
denial of the right to return to one's country, mass uprooting of a country's population,
denial of freedom of privacy such as the right to marry and raise a family, and invidious
racial or religious persecution. Comment M provides that any state party under the
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights that violates any of these rights a single time is
liable and that any state is liable under customary law for a consistent pattern of state
violations of any right. RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 702 cmt. m.
176 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 4. Meron notes that while the Restatement
includes the right to leave one's country as a fundamental right, a study prepared for the
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One step towards determining whether a right constitutes a
fundamental right may involve examining the sort of obligations the
right creates. In the Barcelona Traction case,17 the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) stated in dictum that "basic [fundamental] rights" create
obligations erga omnes.178 If a right has erga omnes status, all states have
an interest and are obligated to protect that right.179 In other words, any
state can bring action against the violators of such a right, regardless of
whether the victim is a citizen of the state.180 Thus, the ICJ suggests that
one can identify fundamental rights as those having erga omnes
obligations.' 8'
Though this presents a possible path to identify fundamental rights,
Professor Meron notes that since the Barcelona Traction case, a growing
consensus views the erga omnes character of human rights as not limited
to basic or fundamental rights.182 In fact, the Restatement provides that
any state may pursue international remedies against any other state (erga
omnes obligations) simply for the violation of customary law.ls3 In this
way, a right may become customary law without being fundamental, yet
still enjoy erga omnes character. Due to the different notions regarding
erga omnes obligations, this principle lends little help in identifying
fundamental rights.184
Professor Meron comments that most would agree that the right to
life from arbitrary deprivation, protection from torture, egregious racial
discrimination, and prolonged arbitrary detention, are fundamental
rights.18s He also includes those rights which are non-derogable under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention Discrimination and Protection of Minorities questions
whether the right to leave one's country is a right or a "mere human attribute." Id. at 5.
17 Barcelona Traction Case (Bel. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction]
(holding that Belgium was not entitled to bring an action on behalf of nationals who owned
ninety percent of a Canadian corporation which in turn owned a Spanish corporation and
suffered injury as a result of action by Spain, because Belgium's interest was too indirect).
178 Id. at para. 33-34. See Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 10-11.
179 Barcelona Traction, supra note 177, at para. 33-34. The Court mentioned the protection
from slavery and racial discrimination as examples of fundamental rights. Id. See 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds. 9th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM'S].
180 Barcelona Traction, supra note 177, at para. 33-34; MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS, supra note 108, at 194.
181 Supra note 178 and accompanying text.
18 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 11-12.
183 RESTATEMENT 3d, supra note 97, at § 703 reporter's note 3.
18 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 13.
185 MERON, HUMANrrARIAN NORMS, supra note 108, at 193.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/12
1998] DISCRIMINATING AMONG RIGHTS? 399
Convention, and the American Convention on Human Rights, such as
the right to life1 86 and the prohibitions of slavery,187 torture,188 and
retroactive penal measures.18 9 Though these seem the most likely to be
considered fundamental, neither consensus as to any additional
fundamental rights, nor criterion for ascertaining fundamental human
rights exists. 190
No agreement exists because discerning between those rights which
are fundamental and those rights which are not involves the application
of subjective standards. Professor Meron maintains that characterizing
some rights as fundamental "results largely from . . . subjective
perceptions of their importance." 191 He contends that while some view
due process rights as fundamental, others believe that the rights to food
and other basic needs supersede due process rights.192
A recent statement by the Premier of China, Jiang Zemin, serves as
an excellent example of the subjectivity involved in choosing
fundamental rights. When asked about the many civil and political
rights refused to his country's citizens as well as the many political
prisoners within China, Premier Zemin responded by stating, "I believe
186 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 6(1); The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, U.K.T.S.
71, art. 2 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22,1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,9 I.L.M. 673, art. 4(1) [hereinafter American Convention].
187 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 8; European Convention, supra note 186, at art. 4(1);
American Convention, supra note 186, at art. 6.
188 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 7; European Convention, supra note 186, at art. 3; American
Convention, supra note 186, at art. 5(2).
189 ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 15. European Convention, supra note 186, at art. 7; American
Convention, supra note 186, at art. 9.
'9 MERON, HUMANITARIAN NORMS, supra note 108, at 194. See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 37-45. Professor Donnelly reviews the attempts of other
scholars, including Henry Shue, to construct a list of basic rights. Id. at 39. He notes that all
the lists have one thing in common: if all the "basic" rights were enjoyed, people would
still be "living degraded lives." Id. at 41. He writes:
Without other human rights, "basic human rights" are inadequate to
protect human dignity in any plausible sense of that term. Human
dignity, the realization of which is the aim of human rights, cannot be
reduced to dimensions that can be encompassed by a short or narrow
list of "basic" human rights. All human rights are "basic rights" in the
fundamental sense that systematic violations of any human right
preclude realizing a life full of human dignity-that is, prevent one
from enjoying the minimum conditions necessary for a life worthy of a
human being.
Id.
191 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 8.
'9 MERON, HUMANITARIAN NORMS, supra note 108, at 194.
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the most important, the most fundamental human right is how to ensure
that the 1.2 billion Chinese people have adequate food and clothing." 193
From Premier Zemin's perspective, China must first address the welfare
rights of China's citizens before addressing civil and political rights, such
as the freedom of speech. United States citizens, whose history
emphasizes other fundamental rights such as the right to free speech,194
would likely disagree with China's preference for economic rights.
Thus, two versions of fundamental rights emerge.
Addressing the problem of subjectivity in determining those rights
which are fundamental, Professor Meron states, "it is fraught with
personal, cultural and political bias, and has not been addressed by the
international community as a whole, perhaps because of the
improbability of reaching a meaningful consensus." 195  Professor
Donnelly contends that states emphasize certain human rights because of
their good track record of observance. 196 Thus, the United States'
support of personal rights abroad reflects its support of personal rights
at home.197 Without a "comprehensive normative and empirical theory
of human rights," basic rights may be chosen on the basis of domestic
"convenience" or "policy." 98 While the international community has
agreed upon a listing of human rights in the Declaration, prioritizing
them according to their fundamental nature seems largely an exercise
controlled by national perceptions and morals. Though fundamental or
basic rights may exist, agreement regarding such a list is scarce. Because
of the difficulty in assessing fundamental rights, the principle of jus
cogens exists as a possible method for identifying the most important
human rights.
2. Jus Cogens/Peremptory Norms
Norms defined as jus cogens, or peremptory norms, enjoy the highest
status in international law and trump both treaties and customary law.199
193 U.S. and China: Ups & Downs, TIME, Oct. 27, 1997, at 17.
19 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
195 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 108, at 4.
1% DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 44.
197 Id.
198 Professor Donnelly does not oppose the construction of a list of basic rights. On the
contrary, he remarks that for purposes of foreign policy, states may have to set limited
goals, concentrating on the "most important" human rights. In his discussion of lists of
basic rights, however, he sheds light on the difficulty of constructing a sound and effective
list of basic rights and thus calls for theoretical guidance. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 43-4.
'99 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that the obligation of parties to obey a judgment from the International
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A peremptory norm is only modified if a new peremptory norm emerges
which requires it to be modified. 20° If an existing treaty is in conflict with
a new peremptory norm, that treaty becomes void and terminates.2 1 A
new peremptory norm can terminate such a treaty because derogation
from peremptory norms is not permitted.2 2 Compared to the formation
of customary law, which requires that a norm be "generally practiced,"
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention provides that a peremptory norm is
formed when the norm is "accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole .... 203 The Restatement explains that
acceptance by the whole international community means acceptance by a
"very large majority of states," even if a small minority of states
dissents. 204 Still, ascertaining when a "large majority of states" has
accepted the norm becomes difficult. While the threshold for a
peremptory norm seems higher than that for customary law, discerning
the appropriate line of recognition and acceptance by the "whole" of the
international community indeed seems a difficult task.2°s
Perhaps as a result of the difficulty involved in ascertaining the
threshold for peremptory norms, lack of agreement exists regarding the
content of jus cogens.2°6 Though the Vienna Convention states the
process for formation, it refrains from listing those rights it considers jus
cogens.2° 7 The drafters of the Restatement, however, state that those
Court of Justice is not a peremptory norm, and therefore, the United States did not violate a
peremptory norm when it contravened such a judgment).
2w Vienna Convention, supra note 93, at art. 53.
201 Id. at art. 64.
2w Id. at art. 53.
Id. at art. 53.
2N RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 102, reporters' note 6.
2o5 Simma & Alston, supra note 109, at 24-25. The practice of states is difficult to assess
because most of jus cogens are "rules of abstention," in that states abstain from taking a
particular course of action. Id. at 24. Whether states have recognized and accepted a norm
as peremptory becomes a question of whether states have abstained from such conduct.
Alston notes that one must consider the intention motivating such an abstention. Id. at 25.
Alston then suggests that opinio juris may play an important part in the recognition of
peremptory norms in light of the difficulty in assessing state practice. Id. Still, in order for
a norm to have peremptory status, the "whole" of the "international community" must
practice the norm, making such a determination especially difficult. Id.
2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 102 reporters' note 6; OPPENHEIM's, supra note 179, at 5
(stating that there is "no general agreement as to which rules have this character"); Meron,
On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 14. The Restatement notes that there is "general
agreement" that the Charter principles prohibiting the use of force are jus cogens. The
Restatement also notes that norms creating "international crimes," such as rules
prohibiting genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross violations of
human rights, and perhaps attacks of diplomats, may have peremptory status.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 102 reporters' note 6.
217 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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rights listed as customary norms which are prohibitory in nature are jus
cogens.208 In another work, the drafters further assert that the Universal
Declaration is "established customary law, having the attributes of jus
cogens. "209 Alfred Verdross, though, remarks that all "rules of general
international law created for a humanitarian purpose" constitute jus
cogens.210  In sum, the full content of jus cogens has yet. to be
determined.2 '
Without consensus regarding fundamental rights and the difficulties
associated in identifying peremptory norms, it is clear that no common
understanding of a hierarchy of human rights exits. Cultural, economic,
and political biases affect states' perceptions of fundamental rights,
thereby making a common understanding impossible at this point in
time.212 Similarly, no common understanding exists as to those rights
which may have status as jus cogens. Presently, no standards for
distinguishing between fundamental rights and ordinary rights exist and
peremptory norms have yet to be worked out. The future will hopefully
help to reconcile both. The international community must work to
provide criteria for differentiating among rights213 and allow peremptory
norms the time to develop.214 In the mean time, when legislating human
rights policy, every state must keep in mind that no common
understanding of a hierarchy of human rights exists.
D. What is the Common Understanding?
The only true international consensus regarding human rights lies in
the listing of rights in the Declaration. 215 Though states cannot agree on
the prioritizing of these rights, states can and have agreed as to their
status as human rights.216 The Declaration stands as proof of the ability
of states to identify those rights belonging to every human. But, at the
20 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 702 reporters' note 11. The Restatement lists the
following rights as customary norms, and therefore peremptory norms: prohibitions
against genocide, slavery, murder or causing disappearance of individuals, torture,
arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination. Id. at § 702 (a)-(f).
20 MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNrIY 274 (1980).
210 Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 60,
53,59 (1966).
211 OPPENHEIM'S, supra note 179, at 6 (stating that the content must be determined through
the "practice of states" and "jurisprudence of international tribunals").
212 See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
213 Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 23.
214 Id. at 22.
215 See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
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same time, the Declaration provides evidence of the international
community's unwillingness to rank human rights. 217
The ratification of the two Covenants, however, spurred inquiries
into the relationship between civil and political rights, and economic,
social, and cultural rights. 218  Many inquired whether the rights
protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) supersede the rights protected under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).219 The
differing nature of state party obligations under the two Covenants has
contributed in large part to this inquiry.
Once a state ratifies the ICCPR, the Covenant demands that the state
ensure to all individuals within its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the Covenant.220 Ratification of the ICESCR, on the other hand, is less
stringent and obligates the state to take the necessary steps to maximize
its resources in order to realize the rights within the Covenant.221 The
stricter obligations demanded by the ICCPR initially seem to suggest
that the rights contained in that Covenant are more valued than the
rights within the ICESCR.222 However, the Preamble of each Covenant
217 Nayar, supra note 2, at 818.
218 See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
219 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 263, 1127; Meron, On a Hierarchy, supra note 170, at 1;
van Boven, supra note 27, at 48-53; DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at
28-37. As discussed, the U.N. had planned to draft an International Bill of Rights,
encompassing both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights. Because of
the varied nature of the rights, however, two documents were drafted. See supra notes 52-
55 and accompanying text.
no ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 2 para. 1.
2l ICESCR, supra note 76, art. 2 para. 1.
222 See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 31-37. Discussion regarding
the value of the rights has often centered around the concept of "negative" and "positive"
rights. Viewed in this light, much of the ICCPR protects "negative rights" in that the rights
prohibit certain action of others, such as the prohibition of slavery. It has been argued that
these rights deserve priority because they involve direct infliction of injury. Id. at 34. The
ICESCR, however, protects "positive" rights, in that the rights require others to act for the
rights to be realized. Id. at 33. This distinction between the negative and positive rights,
however, fades when considering the actual implementation of the rights. Id. at 33. For a
negative right, such as protection against torture, requires the state to refrain from
torturing. But this also includes the positive duty of the state to supervise and control its
police and security forces. Id. Similarly, a positive right, such as the right to be fed, may
require a government to refrain from the exporting of local crops and allow local crops to
be locally consumed. Id. Professor Donnelly remarks, "All human rights require both
positive action and restraint on the part of the state." Id Professor Donnelly notes that
even if civil and political rights were wholly negative, they would not possess priority over
economic, social and cultural rights. Id. at 34. For acts of commission (negative rights) as
well as acts of omission (positive rights) can result in the same human rights violation. Id.
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addresses this concern and states that in order to achieve the
Declaration's vision for civil and political freedom, as well the economic,
social, and cultural freedom, states must create an environment where
both sets of rights are equally recognized.3 The Covenants, then, assert
the interdependent nature of these two sets of rights.224
The U.N. General Assembly has reiterated in other forums its
dedication to the interdependence and interrelated nature of human
rights.225 For example, when the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the
Proclamation of Teheran in 1977, the Assembly stated its approach in
resolution 32/130 for future human rights work within the U.N.:
All human rights and fundamental freedoms are
indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and
urgent consideration should be given to the economic,
social, and cultural rights; The full realization of civil
and political rights without the enjoyment of economic,
social and cultural rights is impossible; the achievement
of lasting progress in the implementation of human
rights is dependent upon sound and effective national
and international policies of economic and social
development .... 226
The Declaration and Covenants, as well as later statements from the U.N.
General Assembly, reveal that the common understanding of human
rights maintains the interrelated nature of those rights.227
Whenever a state acts unilaterally in the protection of human rights,
it cannot ignore the context within which it acts, for this context is the
international community. 228 The United States acts to protect human
2m ICCPR, supra note 62, at preamble para. 3; ICESCR, supra note 76, at preamble para. 2.
224 Not only do the Covenants state their interrelated nature, but the rights conferred in
each of them work together for their full realization. For example, the ICESCR protects the
right to form trade unions. ICESCR, supra note 76, at art. 8(1). The ICCPR, then, guarantees
the right to freedom of association. ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 22(1). See STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 2, at 263, for discussion of this example as well as explanation
regarding the similarity of rights within the documents.
225 See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
226 van Boven, supra note 27, at 51. Sohn, supra note 2, at 62-63.
227 Id.
2 This is not to suggest that states should not take national action. National action plays
an integral role in the protection of human rights on an international level. DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 266-269. States, however, cannot lose sight of
the fact that international human rights norms have developed. As Professor Donnelly
states, "The moral universality of human rights, which has been codified in a strong set of
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rights inside and outside its borders. The Declaration of Independence,
with its listing of the inalienable rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," and the Bill of Rights have served as the sources for the
United States' commitment to human rights on a domestic level.229 The
United States commitment to the protection of human rights outside of
its borders, however, derives from its obligations as a Declaration
signatory3 ° To ignore this fact is to ignore the basis upon which the
struggle for human rights began and the pledge which the member
states took in their signing of the Universal Declaration: full realization
of human rights lies in a common understanding of them.
The common understanding of human rights asserts that all human
rights are interdependent and interrelated.231  In the International
Religious Freedom Act, however, the U.S. has taken a unilateral measure
to institute a hierarchy. Thus, the Act runs contrary to the very
foundation of the international effort to protect human rights. Such
contradiction carries consequences.
V. HIERARCHY AND ITS IMPACT ON CUSTOMARY LAW
A. The International Religious Freedom Act and Its Two Principles
The IFRA begins by stating that "the right to freedom of religion
undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States," and cites
several international agreements and covenants asserting religious
authoritative international norms, must be realized through particularities of national
action." Id. at 269. Thus, the international norms must serve as the basis for national
action. Another scholar notes that the U.S. has a history of difficulty in "adjusting to an
interdependent, nonhegemonic world." DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 137-38 (1991). In the human rights arena, this difficulty shows itself in
the United States' prioritization of civil and political rights. Id.
229 Nayar, supra note 2, at 825; PETER R. BAEHR, THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN
POLICY 82 (1994). The international effort to protect human rights asks the United States to
go beyond its own "tradition" and recognize the importance of such rights as "adequate
food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education." FORSYTHE, supra note 228, at 138.
m Nayar, supra note 2, at 825. Professor Nayar notes that President Jimmy Carter
recognized that when states signed and ratified the Charter, they pledged not only to
respect the rights of their own citizens, but they also pledged that any mistreatment of their
own citizens would result in the inquiry by other states. Id.
231 More specifically, the human right of the freedom of religion cannot be isolated from the
general principle of equality. In other words, because human rights are indivisible,
measures to remedy religious discrimination must be coordinated with measures to
remedy other types of discrimination, such as racial, gender, education, and employment.
Lemer, supra note 164, at 106.
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freedom as a human right.232 Underscoring religious freedom's status as
an internationally recognized human right, section 2 of the Bill cites
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, 23 and Article 18 of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.23m Governments, then, have the
responsibility to protect the fundamental right of religious freedom and
"pursue justice for all." -  With the inclusion and citation to these
international documents, the Act explicitly places itself in the context of
the international pursuit to protect religious freedom.236
Upon first glance, the Act seemingly advances one principle-that
every human has the right to choose his or her own religion or belief and
not to be persecuted for that choice. As the drafters of the Act state in
section 2, international agreements strongly support this principle and,
as a right held by each human, religious freedom no doubt deserves
protection. 237 The purpose of this Act, the protection of religious
freedom, is thus not only valid, but vital.
Certainly, the recent interest of Americans and their representatives
in the denial of religious rights around the world is encouraging and a
sign that the protection of human rights has become a matter of public
concern.238 The introduction of the IFRA represents a real and legitimate
concern that violations of religious freedom have gone largely unnoticed,
2m International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, _ Stat. _ § 2(1), (2).
Opening with these words regarding the United States' historical tradition of religious
freedom, the Act provides clear evidence of the subjective perceptions at work in defining
which rights deserve more protection than others. See supra notes 191-197 and
accompanying text.
2m "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance." Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at art. 18.
2m "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching... " ICCPR,
supra note 62, at art. 18.
= International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, _ Stat. _ § 2(3).
236 Even if the Act did not cite these international agreements, because the Act addresses an
internationally recognized right, the Act exists in the context of international norms. See
supra notes 87-150 and accompanying text.2P See supra notes 158, 233-34 and accompanying text.
2m Though there is impressive constituent support for the Act, especially from the Christian
Right, others have voiced their concerns regarding a resulting hierarchy of human rights.
See Anthony Lewis, Religious Persecution Act First Step Toward Hierarchy of Fundamental
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 13A.; Editorial, Freedom of Religions, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1997, at A14; Pat M. Holt, Religious Persecution In the Global Balance: It May Rightfully
Rank Low In World Security Priorities, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, October 2,1997, at 19.
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and for this reason, have escalated in number and severity. 239 Theodor
Meron comments that when governments decide to act in the protection
of a particular right, they are usually concerned with the "egregious"
nature of the violation.24° Meron's comment certainly rings true for the
IFRA. For the Act exists as a response to the egregious nature of
violations of religious freedom.
Closer examination, however, reveals a second principle at work.
The goal of the Act clearly conforms with the cited international
agreements, but the means to achieve it does not. In order to influence
the realization of religious freedom on the international scene, the Act
establishes an Office on International Religious Freedom, a Commission,
and a position of Special Adviser, and provides for presidential action in
response to states' violations of religious freedom. In so doing, the Act
established a de facto preference for religious rights. That is, the Act's
method for the promotion of religious freedom-the establishment of a
framework only for this right-reflects the principle of a hierarchy of
human rights.241
While Meron comments that governments act in response to
"egregious" violations of human rights, he asserts that governments do
not concern themselves with questions regarding the existence of a
hierarchy.242  In the IFRA's case, Meron is correct again. The IFRA
intends to respond to the egregious violations of religious rights with its
23 See Susan Gvozdas, Christian Coalition Broadens Focus: Religious Persecution Targeted,
U.S.A. TODAY, August 27, 1997, at 8(A); Terry Mattingly, Clergy Call for Fight Against
Persecution: Religious Leaders Trade Tales of Oppression at Unveiling of Legislation, MILWAUKEE
J. & SENTINEL, May 31, 1997, at 2; Larry Witham, New Ad Sheds Light on Persecution of
Religious Believers, WASH. TIMES, MAY 29,1997, at A(5).
240 Meron, State Responsibility, supra note 11, at 384. Meron states that governments also
often look to the "massive" and grave nature of the violation. Id.
241 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright remarked on the importance of the "method" with
which the United States seeks to protect rights, stating:
If we are to be effective in defending the values we cherish, we must
also take into account the perspectives and values of others. We must
recognize that our relations with the world are not fully encompassed
by any single issue or set of issues. And we must do all we can to
ensure that the world's attention is focused on the principles we
embrace, not diverted by the methods we use.
Madeleine K. Albright, Religious Freedom, Remarks at the Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University (Oct. 23, 1997) [italics added]. With these words, Secretary of State
Albright was likely referring to the methods with which we deal with violations, such as
sanctions against the violating state. Still, her words help to make the distinction between
the ultimate purpose-protection of a human right-and the method used to achieve it.
242 Meron, State Responsibility, supra note 11, at 384.
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first principle. But it perhaps unknowingly asserts a hierarchy with its
second principle.
These two principles do not function independently of one another.
In fact, the method instituted by the Act necessarily alters or skews the
human right it seeks to protect. Under the IFRA, the human right of
religious freedom no longer exists on the same level as other rights, such
as political freedom or due process rights, and instead becomes the
highest human right. The Act asserts this in contrast to several U.N.
documents that stand for the indivisibility of rights.24 For the Act,
religious freedom is no longer one right among equals, but one above the
rest. The special protection afforded to religious freedom skews the
nature of the right itself, because religious freedom moves to the apex of
a hierarchy of human rights. The IFRA's hierarchy has significant
impact on the emerging customary norm of religious freedom. 2"
B. The Differing Nature of Humanitarian Norms of Customary Law
Human rights norms have emerged as customary law in a way
different from traditional customary law.24 In the traditional sense,
customary norms develop through a lengthy process of state practice
that is performed by states because of opinio juris. This state practice
consists of the daily action of states. This notion of state practice is
arbitrary in that it does not rely on states' cooperation to form a
243 U.N. documents maintain the equality of human rights. The Declaration states that the
"recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."
Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at preamble para. 1. Throughout the document, the
Declaration makes no distinction between the rights it lists as those belonging to each
human. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supports the belief that all
rights are interdependent and interrelated by stating, "in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political
freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social,
and cultural rights." Like the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR nowhere states that there is
an ordering of rights. ICCPR, supra note 62, at preamble para. 3. Finally, the Declaration
on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, focusing on religious discrimination nowhere states that the human right of
religious freedom deserves the highest priority. Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms, supra note 164, at preamble. Rather, it places it in the context of the promotion of all
"human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id.
244 While some view religious freedom as a customary norm, its status as such has not yet
gained universal status. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text. Even for those
who assert that religious freedom is customary law, the singling-out of one right over all
others should be disturbing in light of the international assertion of the interdependent
nature of rights. See supra note 243.
245 See supra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
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consensus on a given norm.246 Instead, such practice looks to the
individual actions of states to discern whether a customary norm exists.
The formation of humanitarian customary norms, however, has
depended upon a different notion of "state practice." First, instead of
"state practice" referring to individual state action, the "state practice" of
humanitarian customary norms largely refers to the statements or
intentions of states, or "paper practice." 247  In this different
understanding of state practice, states are much more deliberate in their
advocacy of a particular human right, because they express their support
for and intention to observe it. In this way, state practice leading to the
formation of humanitarian customary norms seems much less arbitrary
than the traditional notion of state practice.
State practice in the development of humanitarian customary norms
differs from the traditional notion of state practice in a second way.
Rather than individually asserting their intentions and beliefs regarding
the protection of human rights, states have acted together to
cooperatively assert their stance. 248  Customary human rights law,
therefore, has its beginnings in states "teaming-up" to express their
shared intentions for the promotion of human rights. International
agreements made under the auspices of the United Nations or regional
human rights organizations provide evidence of such "teamwork." 249
Thus, as opposed to the traditional notion of state practice, humanitarian
customary norms begin with a consensus and follow with individual
state action adhering to that consensus.
Humanitarian customary norms, therefore, emerge from a more
concerted effort than traditional customary norms. States express their
intentions to observe human rights and do so through forming a
consensus with other states. The agreements representing the consensus
of states, such as the Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, stress the
interdependent and interrelated nature of human rights.25° When these
documents are used as evidence of state practice regarding a particular
human right, they reveal the principle of the indivisibility of rights. In
246 The second component of customary law, opinio juris, exists as the component which
reflects consensus regarding the legal obligation of a given norm. Still, traditional
customary law relies on individual state practice to reveal the consensus regarding the
legal obligation. In short, the traditional formation of customary law depends on
individual state action. See generally supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.247 See suprd note 113 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 16, 109-119.
249 The U.S. has participated in numerous such efforts. See supra note 151.
2 See supra notes 214-231 and accompanying text.
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summary, state practice contributing to the formation of humanitarian
customary norms consists of deliberate, cooperative efforts of states to
express their support for human rights and reveals the principle of the
indivisibility of those rights.
C. The IFRA At Odds With Customary Human Rights Law
The emerging customary norm of religious freedom based on such a
cooperative effort of states to assert indivisible rights, does not include
the implicit principle of a hierarchy. Rather, the emerging customary
norm of religious freedom explicitly asserts the principle of the
interrelatedness of rights.251 The IFRA stands in contrast to the emerging
custom of religious freedom and works to its detriment in two ways.
First, the IFRA, by itself, cannot legitimately contribute to the
emergence of this customary norm of religious freedom. The emerging
customary norm, based on the common understanding of states,
maintains the equality of all rights, and therefore, places religious
freedom on an equal level with all others. The IFRA, however, provides
a special method to protect religious freedom, thereby giving this right
special status.252 The emergence of the customary norm of religious
freedom requires the common understanding of the indivisibility of
rights. Because the IFRA sets forth a hierarchy of rights, it fails to
contribute to the emerging customary norm of religious freedom. The
Restatement provides that state practice in building customary law
includes, "action by states to conform their national law or practice to
standards or principles declared by international bodies, and the
incorporation of human rights provisions, directly or by reference, in
national constitutions and laws; invocation of human rights principles in
national policy . . . ."m As a national law, the IFRA would claim to
adhere to the principles of international consensus, but in fact, it fails
because it promotes the notion of a hierarchy. As a result, the IFRA
cannot contribute to the emerging customary norm of religious freedom.
Second, in failing to contribute to the formation of this customary
norm, the IFRA acts to promote a different understanding of religious
freedom. According to this understanding, states may apply their own
subjective standards and may give preference to one right. Customary
law of human rights, by contrast, relies on the teamwork and
cooperation of states as evidenced by international agreements to reveal
251 Id.
252 See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
m
5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 701, reporters' note 2.
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consensus regarding a particular right. In turn, states act in accordance
with the customary norm. In contrast, instead of acting in accordance
with the consensus which maintains the interrelated nature of rights, the
IFRA acts unilaterally and applies its own subjective notions regarding
religious freedom. 24 Therefore, while the formation of humanitarian
customs relies on teamwork and consensus, the IFRA relies on unilateral
action and the application of subjective standards.
In its failure to contribute to the emergence of this customary norm
and its promotion of a different understanding, the IFRA will slow the
emergence of the customary norm of religious freedom that asserts the
indivisibility of rights. Instead of building momentum for the emerging
customary norm, the IFRA works to fragment the understanding of
religious freedom and its relationship with other rights.
While the IFRA is an important step in the right direction, standing
on its own, it cannot promote the interrelated nature of human rights. In
order to be true to the indivisibility of human rights, the United States
must work to develop a comprehensive human rights policy. Within the
context of a policy which provides a system to practically deal with
human rights violations, the IFRA will not only achieve its goal of the
protection of religious freedom, but also honor the interdependent
relationship of human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The formation of the United Nations set the stage for universal
cooperation, while the Declaration has provided the script. Actual
promotion and protection of human rights, however, has depended
upon the member states to be actors in this international effort. Though
the Declaration did not legally bind states to protect human rights within
their own borders or ensure that these rights were not violated in other
states, its effect on states' actions to protect human rights cannot be
underestimated. Whether a state participates in U.N. sponsored
protection or acts on its own, the Declaration has served as the
foundation for the international understanding of human rights. Because
of its influence, some of the rights listed in the Declaration have become
customary law, and therefore, binding on all states. Put in another way,
as a script, the Declaration has had great influence on the words and
actions of states.
254See infra note 191 and accompanying text for discussion on subjective standards.
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The Declaration asserts the interdependent nature of human rights
as does the international consensus that forms international customary
human rights law. By legislating a hierarchy into its law with the
International Religious Freedom Act, the United States runs counter to
the principle of indivisibility of rights found in customary law. In so
doing, it fails to contribute to the emerging customary norm of religious
freedom, and instead promotes a different understanding of the right
and will ultimately slow or alter its emergence into customary law.
When legislating in the area of internationally recognized human rights,
the United States, like any nation, must remember that it operates within
this context and must work to contribute to the emerging humanitarian
customary norms rather than confusing them. To honor the
interdependent nature of human rights, the United States must legislate
a way in which to deal with violations of human rights and commit to
the protection of all, instead of only one.
-Kristin Nadasdy Wuerffel
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